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Abstract
We consider an environmental enforcement agency who uses the measurement of ambient
pollution to guide its inspections of individual polluters. We compare two different uses of
this information. In a first model, the agency uses a ``threshold strategy": if ambient pollution
exceeds an endogenous threshold, the agency inspects all individual polluters simultaneously.
In a second model, the agency inspects polluters sequentially, and updates its beliefs with
respect to the firms' behavior after each firm inspection. If the cost of delaying the inspection
of noncompliant firms is low enough, this sequential inspection policy is superior to a
simultaneous inspection policy. However, if the cost of delay is high, the agency is better off
if it commits itself to ignoring some information embedded in ambient pollution.
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One of the central results in environmental economics is that pollution taxes and
marketable permits are more cost-eﬀective than uniform standards. The results
obtained by Beavis and Walker (1981), Harford (1978), Keeler (1991), Malik
(1990), Martin (1984) and Sandmo (1999) cast some doubt on this conventional
result in a context where the environmental agency cannot perfectly enforce
environmental standards. However, a casual glance at their models shows that
the conclusion depends critically on the relationship between the probability of
punishment and the pollution levels.
It is indeed relatively common to assume that the probability of inspect-
ing polluters depends on the relation between pollution and the environmental
standard. The underlying idea is that large transgressors will be inspected
more frequently than small ones and that the polluter has to take the eﬀect
on the monitoring probability into account when he decides how much to pol-
lute. Although this approach is reasonable, none of these papers endogenizes
the relationship between ambient pollution levels and inspection probabilities.
On the other hand, several authors have proposed to use ambient-based
policies to regulate non-point source pollution - see the surveys in Shortle and
Abler (1997) and Xepapadeas (1999). The basic idea, ﬁrst proposed by Segerson
(1988), is to take observed ambient pollution as tax basis, rather than individual
emissions of the polluter. There are however some problems with the feasibility
of the proposed schemes (see, for instance, Shortle and Abler (1997)).
Ambient levels could however be a useful source of prior information to
guide the monitoring eﬀorts of the monitoring agency. For instance, according
to Wasserman (1990) the enforcement program in the United States “has placed
a high priority on violations of pollution standards in areas exceeding national
ambient air quality standards for that pollutant”. In the United Kingdom, the
Environment Agency (2000) explicitly recognizes that ambient monitoring “may
be carried out (...) for compliance with legislation (...)”.
Franckx (2001, a) has argued that, by considering a setting where the inspec-
tion agency inspects ambient environmental pollution before deciding to inspect
individual polluters, it should be possible to obtain an explicit relation between
the probability of punishment and the level of pollution. It can then be shown
that if all ﬁrms play the same mixed strategy, the agency will play a “thresh-
old strategy”: it inspects all ﬁrms if and only if ambient pollution exceeds an
endogenous threshold. Otherwise, no ﬁrm is inspected at all. The paper also
shows under which circumstances monitoring ambient pollution constitutes an
improvement compared to a situation where the enforcement agency does not
collect any prior information at all.
In the initial formulation of the problem, it is assumed that, after having
observed ambient pollution, the agency inspects all ﬁrms simultaneously - it does
not update its prior beliefs after inspecting individual ﬁrms. The purpose of this
paper is to extend the basic analysis to a setting where, after having observed
ambient pollution, the agency inspects the ﬁrms sequentially and updates its
beliefs rationally after each ﬁrm inspection. Moreover, we consider explicit costs
1of postponing ﬁrm inspections and show that simultaneous inspections can then
sometimes be superior. Finally, we argue that the results obtained by Franckx
(2001, a) are also valid for a more general objective function for the enforcement
agency.
In Section 2, we ﬁrst deﬁne the general setting of the model. Sequential
inspections are treated in Section 3. We compare these results with the results
obtained in Franckx (2001, a) in Section 4 and oﬀer concluding remarks in
Section 5.
2 General setting of the model
Except if stated explicitly, we keep here all the assumptions of Franckx (2001,
a).
We consider a game without repeated interactions.
For the sake of analytical simplicity, we limit ourselves to an analysis with
two polluting ﬁrms, who can choose between two levels of abatement expendi-
ture, α and 0. If a ﬁrm spends α, it is in compliance.
We assume that, for the agency, the cost of the compliant abatement technol-
ogy is Dc; the cost of noncompliance will be represented as Dnc. Note that Dnc
and Dc can be given a wide range of interpretations. For instance, if the agency
maximizes social welfare, Dnc and Dc are the monetary value of environmental
damages net of private compliance costs. Or, alternatively, for an agency that
narrowly focuses on environmental eﬀects, Dnc and Dc are just the monetary
value of environmental damages. We assume that Dnc > Dc: otherwise, the
agency would have no reason to pursue compliance.
Ambient environmental inspections costs a per time period. Inspecting the
ﬁrm costs b. If a ﬁrm is inspected and is found in noncompliance it will have
to pay a ﬁne Ψ > 0 with certainty. We assume that this ﬁne is set by a higher
authority in government, say the legislator, and is thus exogenous in this model.
We also assume that the agency derives some beneﬁt 4 from inspecting a
noncompliant ﬁrm. For instance, the career perspectives of the agency’s staﬀ
may depend on the number of detected noncompliant ﬁrms, or the staﬀ may
derive some moral satisfaction from ﬁning noncompliant ﬁrms. Alternatively,
the agency might have the authority to put a noncompliant in compliance dur-
ing an inspection; 4 then represents the environmental beneﬁt (net of private
compliance costs) of inspecting a noncompliant ﬁrm. In order to allow for this
latter interpretation, we shall from now on assume that a ﬁrm that is found
in noncompliance has to incur a fraction σ of the costs of purchasing the new
abatement technology, where σ ∈ {0,1} - note that Franckx (2001, a and b)
only considers σ = 1. However, we shall assume that there is no redistribution
of ﬁnes to the agency, so that 4 is completely independent from Ψ.
If a ﬁrm complies, its expected costs are always α. If a noncompliant ﬁrm is
not inspected, its expected costs are zero. If a noncompliant ﬁrm is inspected,
its expected costs are Ψ + σα. This implies immediately that if (1 − σ)α > Ψ,
then the ﬁrm will never comply, even if it is inspected with certainty. Therefore,
2we shall from now on assume that Ψ > (1 − σ)α.
The ﬁrms can choose between complying and not complying; pα
i is the prob-
ability that ﬁrm i complies. The agency commits itself to a permanent monitor-
ing of ambient pollution, and can choose between inspecting and not inspecting
an individual ﬁrm. p(i|k) is the probability that the agency inspects ﬁrm i if
ambient inspections show that k ﬁrms comply.
We shall use the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as solution concept.
This means that each ﬁrm’s strategy must be optimal, given the agency’s and the
other ﬁrm’s strategy, but the agency’s strategy must also be optimal, given the
ﬁrms’ strategies. Moreover, the agency’s beliefs with respect to the actions the
ﬁrms have undertaken must be obtained from the ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies
and from the observation of ambient pollution levels, using Bayes’ rule1 - thus,
the agency’s strategies must be sequentially rational. We assume that the agency
perfectly observes ambient pollution. This implies that it faces two singleton
information sets (both ﬁrms comply, no ﬁrms comply) and one non-singleton
information set (one ﬁrm complies). µi is the agency’s belief that ﬁrm i does not
comply, given that ambient inspections show that one and only ﬁrm complies
and that the agency has not yet inspected any individual ﬁrm.
We shall only consider equilibria where the ﬁrms all play the same strategy.
Finally, if b > 4, the cost of inspecting one ﬁrm is higher than the maximal
possible environmental beneﬁt of inspecting that ﬁrm. The agency will then
never inspect any individual ﬁrm. We shall from now on ignore this possibility.
3 Sequential inspections
The timing of the game is the most important change compared to Franckx
(2001, a):
• Step 0 - The agency commits itself to a permanent observation of ambient
pollution, and to the sequential inspection policy of step 3
• Step 1 - The ﬁrms simultaneously choose their abatement technology
• Step 2 - The inspection agency observes ambient levels
• Step 3 - As with simultaneous inspections, sequential rationality requires
the agency to inspect all ﬁrms immediately if ambient inspections show
that none complies2 and not to inspect the ﬁrms if ambient inspections
show that they all comply. If one and only one ﬁrm complies, the inspec-
tion agency decides whether or not it will inspect an individual ﬁrm. If it
does not, then the game ends. If the agency inspects an individual ﬁrm
and ﬁnds that the ﬁrm is not in compliance, then it levies the ﬁne (and,
1For a formal treatment of this concept, see for instance Fudenberg and Tirole (1995).
2If ambient inspections show that no ﬁrm complies, the inspection agency does not need to
inspect the ﬁrms individually to identify the noncompliant ones. However, it can be doubted
that a court would ﬁnd this a suﬃcient proof to impose a ﬁne, certainly if pollution is stochas-
tic.
3depending on the setting, it imposes the purchase of the compliant tech-
nology). After this ﬁrm inspection, the agency updates its beliefs that the
other ﬁrm complies and ﬁnally decides whether it will inspect the second
ﬁrm.
In this model, there is an explicit time dimension and we shall introduce a
cost of delaying the inspection of noncompliant ﬁrms: if the agency inspects
ﬁrm i ﬁrst, then the beneﬁt of inspecting ﬁrm j if it is noncompliant decreases
to γ4 (for instance, because the environment has further deteriorated while the
agency inspected ﬁrm i).
We can now immediately turn to the three central results of this paper:
Proposition 3.1 If γ4 > b, then the following strategy-belief proﬁle is a PBE:
p(i|2) = p(j|2) = 0; p(i|0) = p(j|0) = p(i|1) = 1; p(j|1) = 1 if ﬁrm i is
inspected and complies and p(j|1) = 0 if ﬁrm i is inspected and does not comply;
pα
i = pα
j = 1. If 2b > γ4, then µi >
2b−γ4
b+(1−γ)4. If γ4 > 2b, then 1 ≥ µi ≥ 0 .
Proof We ﬁrst show that the each ﬁrm’s strategy is an optimal response to
the agency’s and the other ﬁrm’s equilibrium strategy.
The agency’s equilibrium strategy implies that it inspects ﬁrm i with cer-
tainty except if all ﬁrms comply. Firm i is then inspected every time it does
not comply, which implies that ﬁrm i’s optimal reaction is to comply. If both
the agency and ﬁrm i play their equilibrium strategy, then ﬁrm j will always
be inspected if it does not comply. Indeed, if the non-singleton information set
is reached, then the agency will ﬁnd ﬁrm i in compliance and will also inspect
ﬁrm j. But then ﬁrm j also optimally complies!
Thus, each ﬁrm’s strategy is an optimal response to the agency’s and to the
other ﬁrm’s equilibrium strategy.
Let us now turn to the agency’s sequentially rational strategies in the non-
singleton information set.
If the agency does not inspect the ﬁrms, then its expected costs in this
information set are:
a + Dnc + Dc (1)
Suppose that in the non-singleton information set, the agency inspects ﬁrm
i ﬁrst. With probability µi, ﬁrm i does not comply, the agency puts it in
compliance (and thus obtains beneﬁt 4) and levies the ﬁne. The agency knows
now that ﬁrm j complies and it is sequentially rational to stop the inspection
game. If ﬁrm i complies (which happens with probability 1−µi), then the agency
knows that ﬁrm j does not comply. Because γ4 > b, it is also sequentially
rational to inspect ﬁrm j.
Thus, if the agency inspects ﬁrm i ﬁrst in the non-singleton information set,
then its expected costs in this set are:
4a + Dnc + Dc + b − µi 4 +(1 − µi)(b − γ4) (2)
From Expressions 1 and 2, the agency will inspect ﬁrm i in the non-singleton
information set if and only if:
b + (1 − µi)b < µi 4 +(1 − µi)γ4 (3)
Suppose ﬁrst that γ4 > 2b. Because 4 > b, this implies immediately that
Inequality 3 is fulﬁlled for any µi.
If 2b > γ4, then 1 > γ implies that Inequality 3 is fulﬁlled if and only if
µi >
2b−γ4
b+(1−γ)4. Because the non-singleton information set is only reached if one
of the two ﬁrms deviates from its equilibrium strategy, we cannot impose any
restriction on µi, and it is always possible to ﬁnd a µi < 1 that satisﬁes these
restrictions (because 4 > b implies 1 >
2b−γ4
b+(1−γ)4 > 0). 2 QED 2
Proposition 3.2 If b > γ4 and 4 > 2b, then the following strategy-belief
proﬁle is a PBE: If one ﬁrm complies: with probability q, the agency inspects
ﬁrm i and does not inspect ﬁrm j; with probability 1−q, the agency inspects ﬁrm
j and does not inspect ﬁrm i; q = 1





σα+Ψ }; if Ψ > (2−σ)α, then 1 ≥ µi ≥ 0; if (2−σ)α > Ψ,
then µi = 1
2.
Proof We ﬁrst show that the each ﬁrm’s strategy is an optimal response to
the agency’s and the other ﬁrm’s equilibrium strategy.
Given the agency’s equilibrium strategy, ﬁrm i’s expected costs are:
pα
i α + (1 − pα
i )[qpα
j + (1 − pα
j )](σα + Ψ)
Indeed, if ﬁrm i does not comply, it is inspected with probability q if ﬁrm
j complies and it is inspected with certainty if ﬁrm j does not comply. Thus,
given the agency’s strategy, ﬁrm i will be indiﬀerent with respect to the choice
of pα
i if and only if qpα
j + (1 − pα
j ) = α
σα+Ψ.
Similarly, given the agency’s strategy, ﬁrm j will be indiﬀerent with respect
to the choice of pα
i if and only if (1 − q)pα
i + (1 − pα
i ) = α
σα+Ψ.
If the ﬁrms play the same strategy, (1 − q)pα
i + (1 − pα
i ) = qpα
j + (1 − pα
j ) is
only possible if q = 1
2.








Let us now turn to the agency’s sequentially rational strategies in the non-
singleton information set.
Suppose that the agency has inspected a ﬁrst ﬁrm after observing that one
and only one ﬁrm complies. b > γ4 implies that it is not sequentially rational
to inspect a second ﬁrm whether or not the ﬁrst ﬁrm was found in compliance.
5Thus, if the agency plays its equilibrium strategy in the non-singleton infor-
mation set, then its expected costs in this set are:
a + Dnc + Dc + q[b − µi4] + (1 − q)[b − (1 − µi)4] =
a + Dnc + Dc + b − qµi 4 −(1 − q)(1 − µi)4 (4)
From Expressions 4 and 1, the agency will play its equilibrium strategy in
the non-singleton information set if and only if:
b < qµi 4 +(1 − q)(1 − µi)4
q = 1
2 implies that this condition is fulﬁlled if and only if 4 > 2b, indepen-
dently from µi. 2 QED 2
Proposition 3.3 If 2b > 4 > b > γ4, then the following strategy-belief proﬁle




σα+Ψ and µi = 1
2.
Proof Given the agency’s and ﬁrm j’s equilibrium strategy, ﬁrm i’s expected
costs are:
pα
i α + (1 − pα
i )(1 − pα
j )(σα + Ψ)
Indeed, if ﬁrm i does not comply, then it is only inspected if ﬁrm j does not
comply either. Thus, given the agency’s strategy, ﬁrm i will be indiﬀerent with
respect to the choice of pα




Similarly, given the agency’s strategy, ﬁrm j will be indiﬀerent with respect
to the choice of pα




The agency’s sequentially rational strategies follow from the Proof of Propo-
sition 3.2. 2 QED 2
4 Comparison with simultaneous ﬁrm inspec-
tions
How do the results compare to Franckx (2001, a)? It can easily be veriﬁed that
all the main results of that paper can be extended to a context where σ 6= 1.
The comparison with this analysis is then straightforward - see Table I. In the
left column, we summarize the results for sequential ﬁrm inspections. In the
right column, we summarize the results obtained in Franckx (2001, a).
We see that if 2b > 4 > b and γ4 > b, then sequential inspections induce
perfect compliance, while simultaneous inspections induce the ﬁrms to play
mixed strategies. Moreover, with a sequential inspection policy, there will never
be ﬁrm inspections in equilibrium.
6Also, for some parameter values, the probabilities of compliance do not
change (for instance, if b > γ4, 4 > 2b and Ψ > (2 − σ)α, or if and 2b >
4 > b > γ4). It can easily be veriﬁed that the equilibrium probability that the
agency will conduct ﬁrm inspections stays unchanged as well.
However, if b > γ4, 4 > 2b and Ψ < (2 − σ)α, then sequential inspections
lead to a decrease in the probability of compliance. Indeed, 4 > 2b implies
that the agency is better of if it inspects both ﬁrms simultaneously in the non-
singleton information set than if it does not inspect them at all. Thus, if the
ﬁrms know that the agency conducts simultaneous ﬁrm inspections, they will
both comply. However, with sequential ﬁrm inspections, the cost of waiting to
put ﬁrms in compliance is so high (b > γ4 and 4 > 2b is only possible if γ < 1
2)
that the agency never inspects a second ﬁrm in the non-singleton information
set. Thus, in equilibrium, the probability that a ﬁrm gets inspected (and thus
also the expected cost of noncompliance) decreases, for any given probability
that the other ﬁrm complies. If the ﬁne is low enough compared to the cost
of compliance (Ψ < (2 − σ)α), then ﬁrm i will never comply if ﬁrm j always
complies - this explains why, in equilibrium, the ﬁrms play mixed strategies.
These mixed strategies can be given a very natural interpretation in the
context of this game. Harsanyi’s (1973) puriﬁcation theorem implies that the
PBE in the inspection game with complete information can be interpreted as a
pure-strategy PBE in a game with the same structure where the environmental
eﬀect of noncompliance is deterministic but where a ﬁrm found in noncompliance
faces costs that are only observed by this ﬁrm (for instance, administrative costs
linked to the payment of the ﬁnes) - the random changes in these costs imply that
each ﬁrm will comply with the frequency that makes the other ﬁrm indiﬀerent
between complying and not complying.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that, except if the cost of waiting to put ﬁrms in compliance is
too high, conducting sequential ﬁrm inspections (rather than simultaneous ones)
reinforces the argument in favor of ambient inspections. However, if the cost
of delaying the inspection of noncompliant ﬁrms is too high, then the agency is
better oﬀ if it inspects both ﬁrms simultaneously, and deliberately decides not
to gather better information. Thus, the agency can be better oﬀ if it commits
itself to ignoring some of the information embedded in ambient pollution.
It may seem very restrictive to consider only two polluting ﬁrms. However,
the analysis with simultaneous inspection has been extended to a setting with
an arbitrary number of ﬁrms - detailed results are available from the author
on request. Franckx (2001, b) has conducted the analysis with sequential ﬁrm
inspections and three polluting ﬁrms, but without cost of waiting. Not surpris-
ingly, in that setting, sequential ﬁrm inspections always dominate simultaneous
ﬁrm inspections. Preliminary results suggest that introducing explicit time con-
siderations in a model with three ﬁrms adds a lot in analytic complexity but
does not provide new insights compared to the analysis in the present paper.
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